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BIOHAZARD: THE MEDICAL LOSS RATIO AS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE GARBAGE (AND HOW
TO DISPOSE OF IT)
Since the Affordable Care Act (ACA) became law in 2010,1 it has been
subject to political and constitutional scrutiny.2 While most critics have
focused on the expansion of Medicaid and the individual mandate,3 the rest of
the bill is by no means universally praised. One such controversial provision is
the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR). Congress crafted the MLR with the purpose to
improve patient care and reduce unnecessary administrative spending and
excessive corporate profits.4 Those companies which do not, in a given year,
spend the mandated amount on patient care, as opposed to other expenses,
must make up the difference by providing a rebate to their policyholders.5 The
purpose of the rebate is both to provide an incentive for insurance companies
to comply with government regulations regarding revenue apportionment and
compensate consumers who have been “shortchanged.” This Perspective will
(1) show that the MLR is constitutional, (2) but that it is nevertheless poor
policy, and (3) suggest some alternatives for Congress to consider should it
repeal and replace the ACA.6
While no one has yet brought a case challenging the MLR, scholars have
published law review articles both attacking and defending the provision’s
constitutionality.7 The authors of these articles disagree fundamentally about
which constitutional test to apply when analyzing the MLR: specifically,

1

See Patient Protection And Affordable Care Act; Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
3
Id.
4
See 42 U.S. Code § 300gg–18
5
See Medical Loss Ratio, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFORMATION & OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (2017) https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-MarketReforms/Medical-Loss-Ratio.html
6
See generally Paul Howard, The Graham-Cassidy Obamacare Overhaul Is Dead. But It’ll Be Back.,
Washington Examiner (Oct. 5, 2017 at 12:58 PM) http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-graham-cassidyobamacare-overhaul-is-dead-but-itll-be-back/article/2636636
7
See Wesley D. Markham, Healthcare Reform’s Mandatory Medical Loss Ratio: Constitutionality,
Policy, and Implementation, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 139 (2012); Rebecca Kopps, Dead on Arrival: The Health
Insurance Industry’s Bleak Prognosis due to Unconstitutional Ratemaking in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 31 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 577 (2011); Richard Epstein, Constitutional Ratemaking and the
Affordable Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability, 38 Am. J. L. and Med. 243 (2012); Meghan Stubblebine,
The Federal Medical Loss Ratio: A Permissible Federal Regulation Or An Encroachment On State Power?,
55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 341 (2013); Susane Cordner, Note: Adjusting The Benefits And Burdens Of Economic
Life For The Public Good: The Aca’s Medical Loss Ratio As A Constitutional Regulation Of Health Insurance
Companies, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 213 (2015).
2
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within the context of the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause,8 they debate
whether Duquesne9 or Penn Central controls.10,11
Instead of endeavoring to determine which of these tests should apply to
the MLR, I will let sleeping jurisprudential dogs lie and attempt to settle the
question by assuming that the Duquesne test controls and arguing that the
MLR is nonetheless constitutional. Since Cordner argues convincingly12 that,
should the Penn Central test control, the MLR would be constitutional, our
arguments together (if both are accepted), will resolve the question of
constitutionality without need to decide which test applies as a technical
matter.
I.

THE MLR AS CONSTITUTIONAL RATEMAKING EPSTEIN’S ARGUMENT

A. Epstein’s Argument
The MLR stipulates that health insurance issuers must spend 80% of the
premiums they collect in small group and individual markets, and 85% of
premiums in large group markets, on “providing you with health care and
improving the quality of your care (as opposed to what it spends on
administrative, overhead, [profits,] and marketing costs).”13 Richard Epstein
argues the following to show that the MLR is unconstitutional: (1) health
insurance companies are not utilities, but are being regulated like they are;14
(2) this is unnecessary and inappropriate because the health insurance industry
is competitive;15 (3) the government provides no protections or special
considerations to health insurance companies which public utilities enjoy;16 (4)
the extent of regulation through the MLR, coupled with the government’s
ability “to declare rate increases unreasonable, and thus force companies off
8

U.S. CONST. amend. V.cl. 5.
See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 289 (1989) (holding that the decision of the public
utility commission not to consider the investment a utility made in planning to build but never actually
building nuclear plants violated the Fifth Amendment.)
10
See Penn Cent. Trans. Comp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (Holding that a local ordinance
to preserve landmarks which disallowed a train station from modifying part of its building to start a new
business did not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking).
11
See Epstein, supra note 6 and Cordner, supra note 6
12
See Cordner, supra note 6
13
See Stubblebine, supra note 6 at 344 (quoting healthcare.gov)
14
See Epstein, supra note 6 at 261
15
Id.
16
Id. at 262. One might consider health care subsidies which the Affordable Care Act provides to be an
example of such special treatment, but while they do benefit the insurer they are being distributed to the
policyholders.
9

ERKENBRACK GALLEYFINAL

2018]

2/19/2018 3:40 PM

THE MEDICAL LOSS RATIO

111

the exchanges,” (5) stymies the ability of insurance companies to such a degree
that the MLR amounts to a confiscatory taking under the Fifth Amendment. 17
Epstein concedes that this would not be a taking as applied to any new
company which wanted to enter the fold, but that “existing firms…do not have
effective exit rights because of the huge amount of capital they have sunk into
their businesses, which will have to be sold for salvage value if they quit the
business,” resulting in a taking.18 This lack of exit strategy would violate the
rule that insurance companies “are not required to either submit to confiscatory
rates or go out of business.”19
B. MLR Ratemaking as Non-Confiscatory
While cogent, Epstein’s argument contains flaws.20 At the time of its
publication months after Congress enacted the ACA, Epstein could not rely on
empirical data. Instead, he made universal deductive claims that no insurer
could earn a fair rate of return under the new regulatory system.21 Now, some
six years after the passage of the ACA, we do have empirical data and the
results are mixed.
While insurance companies have almost universally lost money on policies
administered under ACA exchanges,22 overall health insurance company
profits are soaring.23 It is difficult to square the proposition of an
17
Id. When Epstein refers to these government declarations, he misrepresents the power they have.
According to his own explanation earlier on (256-257) “While HHS does not have the authority to reject rate
increases, HHS has, nevertheless, called upon health insurance issuers to rescind putatively unreasonable
proposed premium increases.” In fact, this soft scrutiny which lacks rejection power only kicks in when
insurers seek “rate increases of ten percent or more” – and even then all HHS can do is require a justification
to be submitted and issue an opinion about its reasonableness.
18
Id. at 265
19
See Markham, supra note 6 at 159 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E. 2d
698, 703 (1970).
20
See Markham, supra at 156-158. While he ultimately supports Epstein’s conclusion, he points out
four problems with Epstein’s reasoning.
21
See Epstein, supra note 6 at 265
22
See Bob Bryan, The Country’s Largest Health-Insurance Company Is Almost Entirely Quitting
Obamacare, Bus. Insider, (Apr. 19, 2016, 11:40 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/united-healthcarequitting-obamacare-2016-4; Brandon Morse, First Major Health Insurance Company To Withdraw From
Obamacare, The Blaze, (Feb. 14, 2017 at 9:08 PM) http://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/02/14/first-majorhealth-insurance-company-to-withdraw-from-obamacare/; Guy Boulton, Assurant Health, which employs
1,200 in Milwaukee, going out of business, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, (June 10, 2015)
http://archive.jsonline.com/business/assurant-to-exit-health-insurance-business-b99516948z1306779721.html/; Mara Lee, Nonprofit Obamacare Insurer In Connecticut Going Out Of Business, Hartford
Courant (July 5, 2016 at 8:17 PM) http://www.courant.com/business/connecticut-insurance/hc-obamacarehealthy-ct-20160705-story.html.
23
See Jeffrey H. Anderson, Insurers’ Profits Have Nearly Doubled Since Obama Was Elected, The
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unconstitutional taking with the observation that profits of the regulated
companies have almost doubled industry-wide since the ACA’s
implementation.24 Even if limiting the analysis to the segment of insurance
administered under ACA exchanges,25 a causal connection between the
potentially confiscatory rates and the MLR itself is missing. Other regulatory
aspects of the ACA unrelated to the MLR may account for the losses in the
exchanges: namely, the fact that insurance companies must (1) take all comers,
and (2) are very limited in their ability to charge more to people who are more
likely to get sick.26 These market realities and regulations, combined with the
fact that neither the MLR nor any other provision of the ACA actually set
rates,27 demonstrate the MLR’s constitutionality under a public utility
ratemaking analysis.
II. THE MLR IS BAD HEALTH CARE POLICY
Despite being constitutional, the MLR remains poor public policy. The
MLR was passed because “[m]any insurance companies spend a substantial
portion of consumers’ premium dollars on administrative costs and profits,
including executive salaries, overhead, and marketing.”28 The MLR has not
been effective in curbing these expenditures: in addition to the skyrocketing
profits alluded to earlier, at least one study shows that the MLR is actually
responsible for driving health insurance costs higher.29 This is no surprise,
because the MLR creates an incentive for insurance companies to raise the
amount of dollars it spends on patient care (the denominator in the ratio),
which effectively eliminates any incentive for the insurer to bargain with
hospitals, doctors, and pharmaceutical companies to lower prices for patient

Weekly Standard, (Oct. 26, 2016 at 8:00 AM) http://www.weeklystandard.com/insurers-profits-have-nearlydoubled-since-obama-was-elected/article/2005073.
24
Id.
25
Sixty-nine percent of policy holders went through ACA exchanges last year. See Robert Laszewski,
Is Part of the Health-Insurance Market Entering a Death Spiral?, National Review, (Aug. 3, 2017 at 4:00
AM) http://www.nationalreview.com/article/450095/obamacare-death-spiral-exchange-enrollment-down-29percent.
26
Id. at 252.
27
Recall the discussion above regarding the HHS’ ability to oversee rate increases.
28
See note 5 supra
29
See Steve Cicala, Ethan M.J. Lieber, and Victoria Marone, Cost of Service Regulation in U.S. Health
Care: Minimum Medical Loss Ratios, THE NAT’L. BUREAU OF ECON. RSRCH., NBER Working Paper No.
23353 (2017) http://www.nber.org/papers/w23353: (“While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule
creates incentives analogous to cost of service regulation. Using variation created by the rule’s introduction as
a natural experiment, we find claims costs rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory
threshold: 7% in the individual market, and 2% in the group market. Premiums were unaffected.”)
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care. This lack of competition among the different industry interests in health
care keeps prices artificially high.
A. Possible Alternatives
Three possible alternatives to achieve the goals behind the MLR while
limiting some of the problems it has produced are to (1) make health care a
utility, (2) mandate sliding scale care, or (3) enact transparency forcing
regulations to protect free-market competition. Each of these solutions have
positives and negatives discussed below.
1. Make Health Care a Utility
The first alternative is to actually set rates. Under this proposed scheme,
Congress would delegate authority to HHS30 to set fair market rates for every
medical procedure: there would be a set cost for everything from a
preventative care visit to a bypass surgery. While this proposal would do a
great job of reining in the cost of health care, determining a cost for each
procedure would not only be a cumbersome regulatory impossibility, but
would lead to uncertainty about which price category new
procedures/techniques would fall into. Such uncertainty may stifle the
implementation of new medical technologies. Finally, such a regulatory
scheme may affect insurance company profits to such a degree that the taking
might be total or near total, which would force us to reconsider Epstein’s
constitutional concerns.
2. Adopt Universal Sliding Scale Pay through Income Tax
A second option would be to regulate the cost of not health services but
insurance premiums. Under this scheme, everyone would be entitled to the
same essential health benefits,31 but the amount one pays in premiums would
be determined based on income. Since the Supreme Court upheld the
individual mandate under the power to tax, it is likely that this would be a
constitutional solution. This approach is probably doomed politically, though;
the idea of such a massive tax increase (even for universal free healthcare)
would be wildly unpopular and attacked as socialist.

30
One problem with this suggestion is whether to organize it on the local, state, or federal level; public
utilities commissions are state level, but leaving discretion to the states has political and logistical difficulties.
31
See Epstein supra note 6 at 248. They are already mandated under the current version of the ACA.
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3. Enact Transparency Forcing Regulations to Protect Free Market
Competition
Under this approach, consumers would know exactly how much their care
will cost their insurance company before they consume it.32 Insurance
companies could provide rebates to policy holders who elected cheaper/fewer
treatments. This approach would balance the values of protecting vulnerable
consumers while allowing maximum competitive market efficiency, and it
would incentivize both insurance companies and consumers to think about cost
when considering their care decisions. Most importantly, this would spark
competition to lower prices among doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical
companies. This solution is likely not only the most effective but the most
politically feasible of the three I suggest.
CONCLUSION
The MLR is a constitutional but unwise regulation. As Congress considers
new legislation to repeal and replace the ACA, it would be wise to do away
with the MLR and push for regulations which mandate price transparency from
insurance companies, doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies to
protect free-market competition in an industry that is complicated enough both
in the exam room and in the board room to shroud antitrust collusion and
bewilder policy holders who are all, as mortals that can get sick, inherently
vulnerable.
JOSEPH ERKENBRACK

32
Of course, there would have to be exceptions for life-threatening emergencies, and when patients are
unconscious.
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